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I. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission in a workers'
compensation case. The employer and surety appeal from the Commission's decision refusing to
assign partial responsibility for Claimant's total disability benefits to the Idaho Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund. The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (hereinafter ISIF) is an entity whose
purpose is to provide a source of funding for injured workers in cases where an industrial
accident combined with pre-existing physical impairments render a worker permanently and
totally disabled. See Idaho Code §72-332.
This appeal is taken from a final order of the Industrial Commission entered May 14,
2007. The interested parties to this litigation are the employer, The Hagadone Corporation, its
workers' compensation surety, Royal Indemnity Company, from the last industrial accident in
question, and ISIF. While the injured worker, Mr. Robert Stoddard, is named in the pleadings,
he has no intrinsic interest in the outcome of this appeal for reasons that will be set forth in the
subsequent sections of this brief.

The issues for this Court concern disputes between the

employer/surety (hereinafter Hagadone) and ISIF. The issue which brought this matter to appeal
is the extent, if any, to which ISIF is responsible for payment of benefits to Mr. Stoddard.
Arising from that issue are a number of sub-issues resulting from various decisions of the Idaho
Industrial Commission during its handling of the case.
As discussed below, the procedural history of the case is complex and the issues raised by
the case are unique to the workers' compensation system. In part, the complexity of the case
stems from the fact that many issues were initially decided by the Industrial Commission before
ISIF was joined as a party.

However, as noted below, all of the prerequisites for ISIF

responsibility are in place and, but for errors by the Industrial Commission, ISIF should be
sharing responsibility for payment of benefits to the Claimant. Specifically, these Defendants
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assert that the Commission erred in its conclusion that the effects of Mr. Stoddard's last
industrial accident did not "combine with" his pre-existing impairments to produce his total and
permanent disability. This error resulted from the Commission's utilization of an inappropriate
time for judging ISIF' s responsibility. As discussed below, precedent from this Court establishes
that Claimant's status for determination of ISIF responsibility is to be judged as of the time of
the last industrial accident. The Commission, for reasons not explained, chose to judge Mr.
Stoddard's status as of the time of the last Industrial Commission hearing. That decision is
erroneous.
II. PROCEEDINGS BELOW
As noted above, Mr. Robert Stoddard is a named party in the pleadings but is not
participating in this appeal. That case arises from three industrial accidents sustained by Mr.
Stoddard while he worked for Hagadone. His case before the Idaho Industrial Commission
commenced by the filing of a workers compensation complaint alleging entitlement to disability
benefits as the result of a May 5, 1996 industrial accident. The surety on risk at the time of that
particular accident was General Insurance Company of America. (R. p 1)
A second workers compensation complaint was filed alleging an accident of October 10,
1997. Once again, the surety on risk was General Insurance Company of America. (R. p 4).
A third workers compensation complaint as filed against Hagadone alleged an industrial
accident of May 11, 1999. Hagadone's workers' compensation surety at the time of that accident
was Royal Indemnity Company which was the surety on risk at the time Mr. Stoddard stopped
working for Hagadone. (R. p 20). At the time of the last accident Mr. Stoddard was 63 years of
age. (R. p 185).
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None of the three complaints alleged that Mr. Stoddard was totally and permanently
disabled as a result of the industrial accident. Accordingly, the ISIF, which responds only in
cases of total permanent disability was not named initially as a Defendant.
The three claims were consolidated by the Industrial Commission and a hearing was
conducted on March 14, 2001. (R. p 33). The Industrial Commission issued its Findings of Pact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation and Order on September 7, 2001. 1 Referee Michael
Powers issued a number of conclusions and recommendations which were ultimately adopted by
the Industrial Commission. The relevant conclusions for purposes of this appeal are as follows:
1.

That Claimant was entitled to permanent partial impairment (PPI)2

benefits often percent of the whole person from General Insurance for Claimant's
May 5, 1996 accident and injury.

This equates to an award of $11,412.50.

General was given credit for PP! benefits previously paid.
2.

Claimant was entitled to PPI benefits of five percent of the whole person

from Royal for Claimant's May 11, 1999, accident and injury. This equates to an
award of $6,270.00. Royal was given credit for PPI benefits previously paid.
3.

Claimant was found permanently and totally disabled pursuant to the Odd-

Lot Doctrine. General was found liable for 20% of those benefits. Royal was
found liable for 60% of those benefits. (R. p 61 ).
It is to be noted that Referee Powers chose not to utilize the formula set forth by this
court in Carey v. Clearwater Road Dept., 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984) for apportioning
Claimant's disability award among the responsible parties. Referee Powers' conclusions as to
apportioning disability came about after he decided that the use of the "Carey Formula" would

1
2

ISIF was not yet a party at the time of this decision and order.
See Idaho Code §72-422.
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" ... not provide for a fair and equitable apportionment, and, consequently, is not being utilized.
Instead, an apportionment will be based on the relative percentages of PPD (permanent partial
disability) 3 between General and Royal; that is, General is liable for 20% and Royal is liable for
60% of Claimant's permanent and total disability award."

(Findings, Conclusions and

Recommendation, p 28, para 44; R. p 64).
Obviously, the Industrial Commission order caused some consternation to Mr. Stoddard
and his counsel because under the disability analysis of the Commission it was unclear as to the
amount of benefits Claimant was to receive. Mr. Stoddard has been found totally disabled yet
the Defendants were collectively ordered to pay for only 80% of that disability. Mr. Stoddard
raised this issue in Claimant's Motion for Payment Under Idaho Code §72-313, Alternative
Motion for Clarification (Reconsideration) Pursuant to Idaho Code §72-718. (R. pp 104-113).
Mr. Stoddard's concern, of course, was where the additional 20% was going to come from in
terms of benefits payable to the Claimant. Obviously, neither General nor Royal were going to
voluntarily agree to pay that additional 20%. Stoddard's Motion generated a response from
Royal (R. pp 114-116) wherein Royal indicated that, "[t]he Industrial Commission has issued its
order finding the Claimant 100% disabled and then directing General Insurance to pay 20% and
Royal to pay 60%. It is obvious that Claimant is entitled to payment of I 00% of his disability
benefits. The failure of the Referee and/or the Industrial Commission to adequately address that
matter and assign benefits is one appropriately dealt with in a motion for reconsideration." (R. p
115). Royal then filed its Motion for Reconsideration. (R. pp 117-118). In the Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration Royal indicated that it did not challenge the finding that
the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled under the Odd-Lot Doctrine. (R. p 121).
Royal requested that that Industrial Commission make specific findings regarding prior
3

See Idaho Code §72-425
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impairments and the effects of pre-existing impairments on Claimant's disability prior to the last
industrial accident in May of 1999. A re-determination of apportionment was also requested of
the Commission. (R. p 125).
General filed its own Motion for Reconsideration which asked that its liability for 20% of
Claimant's total and permanent disability benefits be re-evaluated. In the alternative General
also asked for clarification of the prior order in the event reconsideration of its liability was
denied. (R. p 129).
On December 14, 2001 the Industrial Commission issued its order regarding the various
motions for reconsideration. In that order, the Industrial Commission evaluated the facts and
arguments previously presented to it and specifically identified noted the absence of ISIF as a
party.

The Commission's order stated: "ISIF was never included as a party to these

proceedings." (R. p 173). Furthermore, the Industrial Commission indicated that in total and
permanent disability cases, the Idaho Supreme Court's previous guidance on apportionment
when pre 0 existing injuries were involved was only specific as to ISIF. The Commission noted it
was unaware of any guidance for determining the percentages for an employer's liability in total
and permanent disability cases with pre-existing impairments and/or disability. (R. pp 173-174).
The Industrial Commission stated that under the facts of this specific case, " ... the Commission
has determined that the last accident caused Claimant to suffer total and permanent disability."
(R. p 174, emphasis added). The following conclusions were rendered and set forth into an
order:
I.

That Defendant Royal would be liable for Claimant's total and permanent

disability pursuant to the Odd-Lot Doctrine.
2.

That Defendant Royal would be liable for sole payment of all such benefits.
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3.

That Defendant General would continue to be, and only be, liable for the 20%

PPD benefits, inclusive of PPI, previously determined from the May 5, 1996 accident and injury.
(R. p 175).

Following and as a result of this order, Royal filed its complaint against ISIF on May 21,
2002. (R. p 84). ISIF answered the complaint on June 4, 2002. (R. p 188).
ISIF complained that it was not appropriate for it to have been brought into the case after
the initial decision. The complaint against ISIF generated a variety of arguments by ISIF as set
forth in ISIF's Petition for Declaratory Ruling, dated October 11, 2002. 4 With regard to the
request for declaratory ruling, on August 27, 2003, the Industrial Commission issued its
Declaratory Ruling addressing the legal issues brought forth by ISIF. (R., Additional Documents
No. 7). In short form, the Industrial Commission reached its conclusion that it did not agree with
ISIF's position that the legal theories of collateral estoppel, waiver, quasi estoppel, due process,
and the provisions of Idaho Code §72-718 would bar Royal's complaint as against ISIF. The
case against ISIF was allowed to proceed.

Specifically, in its conclusion the Industrial

Commission noted:
"Although in hindsight the interests of judicial economy may have beckoned for
the joinder of ISIF in the original cause of action between Claimant, and his
employer and the two sureties, the law does not require it. The ISIF is funded by
a levy from employers/sureties and there is no statute of limitations in Idaho Code
§72-332 for claims against ISIF. Workers and employers benefit from the ISIF.
Its purpose would be thwarted if a claim against ISIF were not permitted."
(Declaratory Ruling p 12, emphasis added).
As a result of this declaratory order, the proceedings as against ISIF went forward to a
second hearing on July 18, 2006, at which ISIF had the opportunity to present its evidence. As
noted by Referee Powers in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation,
4

For some reason, these various pleadings before the Industrial Commission along with the Industrial Commission's
ultimate Declaratory Ruling are identified in the Agency Record as "Additional Documents" numbers 1-7 rather
than specific line items in the Agency's Record, Table of Contents.
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"[ a]s this matter did not directly involve any pecuniary interest of Claimant, he was not present
either in person or by counsel." (R. p 19 I).
As a part of this last litigation before the Industrial Commission, the ISIF presented two
arguments in support of its position that it should bear no responsibility for payment of any
benefits to Stoddard. ISIF argued that the Commission had already determined that Royal was
solely responsible for Claimant's total disability in its earlier rulings. The Industrial Commission
rejected this first argument. (R. p 199). The Referee noted that he was not persuaded by ISIF' s
argument since the first hearing (when ISIF was not a party) did not require a traditional
apportionment analysis. The Referee indicated that the use of the phrase "no other facts or
circumstances had been presented to the Commission" implies that a different analysis of
liability might have been utilized had ISIF been a party to the first litigation. Furthermore, the
Referee indicated that the Industrial Commission's declaratory ruling allowing the joinder of
ISIF by Royal would have been rendered meaningless if the Industrial Commission meant to
"close the door" to ISIF responsibility by holding that the last accident was the sole cause of
Claimant's permanent disability. (R. p 200). Clearly, in reading the Industrial Commission's
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of 200 l along with the body of the Declaratory
Ruling, the Industrial Commission has never held, or even inferred that the entirety of Stoddard's
disability was due only to the May 1999 accident.
ISIF's second argument was that Royal had failed to prove a necessary element for ISIF
responsibility, that being that the effects of Mr. Stoddard's last industrial accident "combined
with" his pre-existing impairments render him totally disabled. (R. p 200). It is this particular
argument that was analyzed by the Referee throughout the remainder of the May 14, 2007
decision. In performing that analysis, the Referee addressed each of the four elements that must
be proven in order to establish ISIF liability - this as set forth in the case of Dumaw v. J.L. North
DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS BRIEF- 7 -

Logging, 118 Idaho 150,795 P.2d 312 (1990). Those elements and the Industrial Commission
analysis are as follows:

1.

Pre-existing Impairment:

The Referee identified the appropriate pre-existing

impairments at page 11, paragraph 11 of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions and
Recommendations. (R. p 201). Permanent impairments were found to total 20% of the whole
15 of the 20 points pre-exist that last industrial accident.

person.

Thus, ¾ of Stoddard's

impairments were fodder for inclusion in a "Carey Formula" analysis of ISIP liability.

2.

Subjective Hindrance:

The Referee found and identified the objective and

subjective hindrance to Claimant's employment as a result of the various pre-existing conditions.
Specifically, the Referee noted that Industrial Commission Vocational Consultant Dan Brownell
testified about changes in Claimant's work capacity occurring prior to the last industrial accident.
The Referee further noted that Royal's vocational expert, Mr. Douglas Crum, testified that
Claimant had incurred disability of75% to 80% before the occurrence of the last accident in May
of 1999. (R. p 201). Interestingly, the Referee apparently used testimony of Stoddard from the
2001 hearing in determining this element of the test was met. (R. p 201 ). Thus, at least part of
the Referee's analysis of facts for the 2007 decision relied upon evidence generated in the 2001
hearing and set forth in the 2001 decision.
3.

Impairment and Hindrance were Manifest: This information was set forth in the

Referee's analysis of the previous elements. (R. p 201).
4.

The Impairment Combines with the Industrial Accident in Causing Total

Disability: At page 11 of the 2007 Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Recommendations the
Referee noted that the relevant " . . . inquiry thus becomes whether Claimant's pre-existing
physical impairments combine with the last accident to render him totally and permanently
disabled, or stated another way, whether Claimant would have been totally and permanently
DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS BRIEF- 8 -

disabled but for his last accident." (R. pp 201-202, emphasis added). The Referee determined
that prior to the last accident Claimant was able to work, albeit with restrictions and
accommodation. (R. p 202). The Referee made a finding that Claimant was no longer able to
perform work after the last accident. (R. p 202). The Referee noted that post May 1999 accident
Claimant made a legitimate attempt to locate work but failed. (R. p 202). The Referee noted that
back in 1999 the last employer was unable to accommodate Stoddard in any further employment.
(R. p 202). The Referee found that, "[t]he last accident resulted in significant standing, sitting,
and walking restrictions and he could only tolerate a four hour work day. It placed Claimant in
the sedentary work category." (R. p 202). It is clear from this information that there has been no
change in the Industrial Commission's prior decision that Stoddard has been totally and
permanently disabled since the date of the last industrial accident in May of 1999.
The final analysis by the Referee as to ISIF liability indicated that the relevant inquiry
was the status of Claimant's disability at the time of the second hearing wherein ISIF was
"allowed" to participate." (R. p 202, emphasis added). It was noted that Claimant was then 70
years of age and still totally and permanently disabled. The Referee asserts that the testimony of
the vocational experts was that at that point in time, when one considered only Claimant's age
and lack of transferable skills in .the sedentary labor market, Claimant was totally and
permanently disabled. The Referee then came to the conclusion that there was no showing that
any of Claimant's pre-existing impairments "combined with" his last industrial accident to
render him totally and permanently disabled so as to invoke ISIF liability. (R. p 202). Based
upon this analysis the Referee found that the Claimant's current total and permanent disability is
due to lack of transferable skills to the sedentary labor market and his advanced age, and not the
result of any combination of Claimant's pre-existing impairment and the last industrial accident.
All liability was placed upon Royal. We are now in the appeal before this collli.
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III. ISSUES
1.

Did the Industrial Commission commit error in its finding that there was no

showing that any of Stoddard's pre-existing impairments combined with his last industrial
accident so as to render him totally and permanently disabled?
2.

Did the Industrial Commission commit error in holding that Claimant's disability

statns was to be analyzed as of the date of the second Industrial Commission hearing on July 18,
2006?
IV. ARGUMENT
This case has presented a rather interesting dilemma with regard to how the Industrial
Commission is to deal with ISIF liability. The dilemma arises from the procedural aspects of the
case as previously set forth. This is a case where the Claimant filed complaints before the
Industrial Commission for three separate industrial accidents. As the court will find from review
of the Agency Record, none of the complaints filed by Claimant, nor any of the answers as filed
by either General or Royal, made any acknowledgements or allegations or assertions of Claimant
being totally and permanently disabled. In fact, with regard to disability issues as raised by
Claimant, this was pied as the "extent of medical impairment, extent of disability in excess of
medical impairment." Insomuch as entitlement to total and permanent disability benefits were
not pied by Claimant, Defendant Royal in its Answer simply identified that apportionment under
Idaho Code §72-406 might be appropriate for pre-existing conditions. 5 Apparently, at some
point in time before the hearing itself actually occurred the parties agreed to address the issue of
whether Claimant was totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the Odd-Lot Doctrine.
Obviously, this issue was tried because that is what landed us in the cmTent predicament.

5

It is to be noted that this particular Code Section is appropriate in "cases ofpennanent disability less than total."
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As noted in the discussion of the rocedural aspects of this case, the Industrial
Commission on September 7, 2001 issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendation. Under the "Odd-Lot Analysis" section of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Recommendation the Referee identified that it was ICRD consultant Brownell's
opinion that Mr. Stoddard was unemployable absent a sympathetic employer situation. The
Referee further identified from Mr. Brownell's testimony that there were only a limited number
of part-time jobs in Stoddard's labor market that would be consistent with the part-time
"sedentary" physical restrictions for employability previously identified, but these were not
evident in "significant numbers".

(R. p 54).

The Referee also cited the testimony of Mr.

Stoddard himself who indicated that at the time of the 200 l hearing he knew that age was
becoming a factor in his search for employment. In 200 I Mr. Stoddard testified as to how tough
it was obtaining employment in the Coeur d'Alene area at his age. (R. p 57). It is to be noted
that at the time of the first hearing Stoddard was 64 years of age. (R. p 36). At the 2007 hearing
no evidence was presented by ISIF to suggest any change in this situation other than the fact that
Stoddard was 6 years older.
The Referee subsequently came to the conclusion at paragraph 40 of the Findings,
Conclusion and Recommendation that Claimant had proven that he was permanently and totally
disabled pursuant to the Odd-Lot Doctrine by the failed job search method. The Referee also
went on to note that due to the fact that Hagadone was the Coeur d'Alene areas third largest
employer with a significant number of sedentary and light duty jobs, that if Hagadone would not
hire this particular individual, then who might? As stated by the Referee, "the only reasonable
answer, especially after the employer contacts Claimant made, is no one." (R. p 58). Thus,
Claimant was found to be totally and permanently disabled based upon evidence submitted at the
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200 I hearing. As of the date of the 2007 hearing there has not been any evidence presented to
suggest this situation had changed.
In 200 I, the Referee also made specific findings that it would be futile for Stoddard to
have continued a fnture search for employment. The Referee made this assessment at page 26,
paragraph 41 of the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations. (R. p 58). It is interesting
that the Referee noted that at the time of this first hearing back in March of 200 I that due to
various objective physical complaints and subjective physical complaints, combined with all the
medical records, that Mr. Stoddard would not be able to perform employment. The Referee also
noted that he had the opportunity to observe Mr. Stoddard during the course of a full day hearing
in coming to these conclusions. Apparently, the Referee also relied upon the testimony of ICRD
consultant Brownell that it would be futile for this gentleman to have continued searching for
jobs in the local labor market into the future. This is a very important point in this particular
case.
In the end, the Referee made the specific finding that, "Defendants have provided no
evidence of any actual job that Claimant could perform on a regular and continuous basis.
McKinney was not retained to find Claimant employment and Brownell could not do so. The
Referee finds that Claimant is permanently and totally disabled." (Findings, Conclusions and
Recommendation p 27, para 43; R. p 59). This is a factual finding of the Industrial Commission
made September 7, 200 I.
In reviewing the record, this court will find that ISIF presented absolutely no evidence to
contradict the previously rendered opinions of the Referee as recited above. ISIF did not present
any . vocational testimony to attempt to show that a search for employment subsequent to
Claimants last accident would not have been futile. ISIF did not present any evidence by way of
cross-examination of any witnesses (as a part of the second hearing) which called into question
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Referee Powers' findings back in 2001 that Mr. Stoddard faced a futile future effort to obtain
employment. ISIF did not present any evidence to contradict the Referee's prior findings that
absent a totally sympathetic employer, that Stoddard wonld have been employable in regularly
occurring jobs subsequent to the last accident in 1999. ISIF presented absolutely no evidence to
refute the appropriateness of previously identified impairments and disabilities addressed by
Referee Powers in the 200 I decision. ISIF presented no evidence that the medical conditions or
physical restrictions imposed upon Mr. Stoddard back in 200 I were any different at the time of
the 2006 hearing.
Royal finds it interesting that in 200 I Referee Powers at paragraph 26 made the following
statement with regard to the last industrial accident: "Dr. Shanks testified that if it wasn't for the
May 11, 1999, slip and fall, Claimant would still be working. Claimant credibly testified that as
a result of the slip and fall he was no longer able to work for Hagadone." These particular
recitations by Referee Powers in 200 I necessarily mean that Stoddard was employable prior to
the last industrial accident even in light of his severe pre-existing disabilities. After all, he was
working at the time of the last accident. Only with the May 1999 industrial accident did all of
the problems come together to render Stoddard disabled under the "odd-lot" doctrine. Such was
the Industrial Commission's determination in 2001 and the 2007 opinion does not revoke that
conclusion. (R. p 50). In short, ISIF presented absolutely no evidence that the earlier disability
finding was somehow different at the time of the second hearing than in 200 I.
What differs between the 200 I and 2007 opinions of the Industrial Commission concerns
the Industrial Commission's approach to the question of whether the effects of the last accident
"combined with" Mr. Stoddard's existing impairments render him totally disabled. While the
Industrial Commission did not technically make a "combined with" analysis in the first decision
because ISIF was not a party, nonetheless certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were
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rendered which were in essence the same as a "combined with" analysis. Royal has already
pointed those out earlier in this Brief. These would be the findings of the Referee in both
opinions that but for the last accident in May of 1999 Claimant would have been employable.
These are statements from the Referee in both opinions that the effects of the pre-existing
impairments, the local labor market, and Claimant's age at the time of the last accident all
combined to render him unemployable absent the intervention of a sympathetic employer. These
facts also include the Industrial Commission's multiple recitations that it would have been futile
for Stoddard to have continued trying to search for employment into the indefinite future because
of the combination of all of these factors that existed in his life as of May of 1999. Basically, the
Commission made all of the findings necessary to conclude that ISIF was partially responsible
for part of Claimant's benefits.
Where the Commission went off track was in concluding that it should judge Mr.
Stoddard's disability as of the time of the second hearing in 2006. Perhaps the most amazing
facet of the Industrial Commission's handling of this case comes in the last couple of paragraphs
of its 2007 decision. At paragraph 14, the decision notes that the relevant inquiry is to determine
Claimant's disability status as of the date the second hearing was conducted. The decision takes
the position that by that point in time Claimant was so old that this factor alone rendered him
totally and permanently disabled as of the date of the second hearing. The decision sweeps
under the rug, and doesn't even discuss the previously held findings that Claimant's situation as
of May of 1999 rendered him totally and permanently disabled.
The Industrial Commission incorrectly used the date of the second hearing in this case as
the time at which they were going to assess ISIF's responsibility, if any, to pay benefits to
Claimant. In doing so the Industrial Commission departed from established precedent of this
Court as announced in Colpaert v. Larsons, Inc., 115 Idaho 825, 771, P.2d 46 (1989).
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In

Colpaert the Court concluded that the appropriate time to determine ISIF exposure would be at
the time of the last industrial accident said to have contributed to the claim for total permanent
disability. The reason the Court looked at the date of the accident was, of course, because Idaho
Code §72-332, the statute which defines ISIF's responsibility, requires that any physical
impairment for which ISIP is responsible pre-exists the last accident. .Focusing on the date of
accident as was done by the Court in Colpaert and as was done by the legislature in Idaho Code
§72-332 makes sense when one considers the purposes behind Idaho Code §72-332 and the
creation of ISIF, that being to encourage an employer to hire people with handicaps.
Interestingly enough, the Industrial Commission in its Declaratory Ruling at page 5 properly
sums up these public policies to be served by the operation of the statute when they write:
Prior to its [ISIP] creation, an employer who hired a person with a partial
disability as subject to the responsibility of paying for total permanent disability
compensation to an employee rendered totally and permanently disabled because
if it is pre-existing condition coupled with a subsequent industrial accident. See
McNeil v. Pan Handle Lumber Company. 34 Idaho 773,203 p 1068 (1921). The
Fund was established to relieve an employer of this burden. The underlying
policy of the Fund is to allow an employer to hire a person with a pre-existing
impairment or disability. The employer would then have a limited exposure
should a subsequent industrial injury render the worker totally and permanently
disabled. 1927 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter I 06, Section 6234, page 141;
recodified in 1971 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 124, page 447.
(Declaratory Ruling, p 5, emphasis added).
In the instant case the Industrial Commission has utilized a fortuitous point in time, that
being the date of the second hearing, to make their assessment as to whether or not ISIF has any
exposure in this matter. Nowhere in their decision do they explain why that date is of any
interest or importance to anybody. This is so in spite of the Court's prior ruling in Colpaert and
the wording of the statute governing ISIF' s responsibility. Nothing in the statute or in the prior
cases from this Court focuses the inquiry on the date the Industrial Commission might chose to
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hold a hearing. The relevant inquiry under both the statute and the Court's precedent is the date
of the final industrial accident which renders th" Claimant totally and permanently disabled.

In this case it has been amply established that Mr. Stoddard was totally and pennanently
disabled following the last industrial accident and at the time of the initial hearing. ISIF has
furnished no evidence to the contrary. By focusing upon the date of the second hearing the
Industrial Commission excuses ISIF from its responsibility to this gentleman simply by virtue of
the passage of time occurring while this case was making its way through the litigation process.
That focus, on the date of the hearing, is misplaced and should be corrected by this Court.
V. CONCLUSION
Royal respectfully asserts that the Industrial Commission's findings from the May 14,
2007 Order with regard to ISIF liability are not only in conflict with the factual findings from its
previous decision as to Mr. Stoddard's claims for total and permanent disability, but in fact are
inconsistent with the provisions of Idaho Code §72-332 which establish ISIF liability.
Additionally, it is asserted that the Industrial Commission's decision also runs contrary to·
longstanding analyses of this Court as to the meaning of the aforementioned statute.
It is believed that Royal clearly proved all the requirements necessary to establish ISIF's
responsibility for a portion of Claimant's benefits.

The Industrial Commission in its 2007

decision has quite simply ignored all these facts by the spurious analysis of looking only at Mr.
Stoddard's age as of the date of the second hearing to determine a timeframe for analyzing ISIF's
liability under Idaho Code §72-332. In this case, the evidence presented by Royal at the May
2006 hearing clearly showed that there had been no change in Mr. Stoddard's condition over the
ensuing years other than the fact that he had aged. Royal presented unrebutted evidence that at a
bare minimum 60% of Mr. Stoddard's disability pre-existed the last industrial accident. In fact,
Royal's expert, Mr. Crum, testified that in actuality it was closer to 75%-80%. Clearly, Royal
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has already paid out more than its dollar share of liability under any scenario of apportionment
with ISIF that may be selected based upon the evidentiary record.
Wherefore, these Appellant's respectfully contend that all the elements of ISIF liability
were met at the second hearing which was conducted in this matter.

The analysis of the

Industrial Commission that ISIF liability is determined solely on the basis of Mr. Stoddard's age
at the time of a second subsequent hearing (years from the date of the last industrial accident
which truly and uncontrovertibly removed him from the labor market) is erroneous and contrary
to Idaho Code §72-332. The decision of the Industrial Commission should be revised and ISIF
ordered to pay its proportionate share of Mr. Stoddard's benefits. Given the evidence submitted,
that share should be at least 60%. This would not adversely impact Mr. Stoddard, but would
only assist in properly allocating responsibility for payment of his benefits.
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